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Abstract
Vulnerability identification is crucial to protect the software systems from attacks
for cyber security. It is especially important to localize the vulnerable functions
among the source code to facilitate the fix. However, it is a challenging and tedious
process, and also requires specialized security expertise. Inspired by the work
on manually-defined patterns of vulnerabilities from various code representation
graphs and the recent advance on graph neural networks, we propose Devign, a
general graph neural network based model for graph-level classification through
learning on a rich set of code semantic representations. It includes a novel Conv
module to efficiently extract useful features in the learned rich node representa-
tions for graph-level classification. The model is trained over manually labeled
datasets built on 4 diversified large-scale open-source C projects that incorporate
high complexity and variety of real source code instead of synthesis code used in
previous works. The results of the extensive evaluation on the datasets demon-
strate thatDevign outperforms the state of the arts significantly with an average of
10.51% higher accuracy and 8.68% F1 score, increases averagely 4.66% accuracy
and 6.37% F1 by the Conv module.
1 Introduction
The number of software vulnerabilities has been increasing rapidly recently, either reported publicly
through CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) or discovered internally in proprietary code.
In particular, the prevalence of open-source libraries not only accounts for the increment, but also
propagates impact. These vulnerabilities, mostly caused by insecure code, can be exploited to attack
software systems and cause substantial damages financially and socially.
Vulnerability identification is a crucial yet challenging problem in security. Beside the classic ap-
proaches such as static analysis [1, 2], dynamic analysis [3–5] and symbolic execution, a number
of advances have been made in applying machine learning as a complementary approach. In these
early methods [6–8], features or patterns hand-crafted by human experts are taken as inputs by ma-
chine learning algorithms to detect vulnerabilities. However, the root causes of vulnerabilities varies
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by types of weaknesses [9] and libraries, making it impractical to characterize all vulnerabilities in
numerous libraries with the hand-crafted features.
To improve usability of the existing approaches and avoid the intense labor of human experts on fea-
ture extraction, recent works investigate the potential of deep neural networks on a more automated
way of vulnerability identification [10–12]. However, all of these works have major limitations in
learning comprehensive program semantics to characterize vulnerabilities of high diversity and com-
plexity in real source code. First, in terms of learning approaches, they either treat the source code
as a flat sequence, which is similar to natural languages or represent it with only partial information.
However, source code is actually more structural and logical than natural languages and has hetero-
geneous aspects of representation such as Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), data flow, control flow and
etc. Moreover, vulnerabilities are sometimes subtle flaws that require comprehensive investigation
from multiple dimensions of semantics. Therefore, the drawbacks in the design of previous works
limit their potentiality to cover various vulnerabilities. Second, in terms of training data, part of
the data in [11] is labeled by static analyzers, which introduced high percentage of false positives
that are not real vulnerabilities. Another part like [10], are simple artificial code (even with “good”
or “bad” inside the code to distinguish the vulnerable code and non-vulnerable code) that are far
beyond the complexity of real code [13].
To this end, we propose a novel graph neural network based model with composite programming
representation for factual vulnerability data. This allows us to encode a full set of classical pro-
gramming code semantics to capture various vulnerability characteristics. A key innovation is a new
Convmodule which takes as input a graph’s heterogeneous node features from gated recurrent units.
The Conv module hierarchically chooses more coarse features via leveraging the traditional convo-
lutional and dense layers for graph level classification. Moreover, to both testify the potential of the
composite programming embedding for source code and the proposed graph neural network model
for the challenging task of vulnerability identification, we compiled manually labeled data sets from
4 popular and diversified libraries in C programming language. We name this model Devign (Deep
Vulnerability Identification via Graph Neural Networks).
• In the composite code representation, with ASTs as the backbone, we explicitly encode the
program control and data dependency at different levels into a joint graph of heterogeneous
edges with each type denoting the connection regarding to the corresponding representation.
The comprehensive representation, not considered in previous works, facilitates to capture
as extensive types and patterns of vulnerabilities as possible, and enables to learn better
node representation through graph neural networks.
• We propose the gated graph neural network model with the Conv module for graph-level
classification. The Convmodule learns hierarchically from the node features to capture the
higher level of representations for graph-level classification tasks.
• We implement Devign, and evaluate its effectiveness through manually labeled data sets
(cost around 600 man-hours) collected from the 4 popular C libraries. We make two
datasets public together with more details (https://sites.google.com/view/devign). The re-
sults show that Devign achieves an average 10.51% higher accuracy and 8.68% F1 score
than baseline methods. Meanwhile, the Conv module brings an average 4.66% accuracy
and 6.37% F1 gain. We apply Devign to 40 latest CVEs collected from the 4 projects and
get 74.11% accuracy, manifesting its usability of discovering new vulnerabilities.
2 The Devign Model
Vulnerability patterns manually crafted with the code property graphs, integrating all syntax and
dependency semantics, have been proved to be one of the most effective approaches [14] to detect
software vulnerabilities. Inspired by this, we designedDevign to automate the above process on code
property graphs to learn vulnerable patterns using graph neural networks [15]. Devign architecture
shown in Figure 1, which includes the three sequential components: 1) Graph Embedding Layer
of Composite Code Semantics, which encodes the raw source code of a function into a joint graph
structure with comprehensive program semantics. 2) Gated Graph Recurrent Layers, which learn
the features of nodes through aggregating and passing information on neighboring nodes in graphs.
3) The Conv module that extracts meaningful node representation for graph-level prediction.
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Figure 1: The Architecture of Devign
2.1 Problem Formulation
Most machine learning or pattern based approaches predict vulnerability at the coarse granularity
level of a source file or an application, i.e., whether a source file or an application is potentially
vulnerable [7, 14, 10, 12]. Here we analyze vulnerable code at the function level which is the fine
level of granularity in the overall flow of vulnerability analysis. We formalize the identification
of vulnerable functions as a binary classification problem, i.e., learning to decide whether a given
function in raw source code is vulnerable or not. Let a sample of data be defined as ((ci, yi)|ci ∈
C, yi ∈ Y), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, where C denotes the set of functions in code, Y = {0, 1}
n represents
the label set with 1 for vulnerable and 0 otherwise, and n is the number of instances. Since ci is a
function, we assume it is encoded as a multi-edged graph gi(V,X,A) ∈ G (See Section 2.2 for the
embedding details). Letm be the total number of nodes in V , X ∈ Rm×d is the initial node feature
matrix where each vertex vj in V is represented by a d-dimensional real-valued vector xj ∈ R
d.
A ∈ {0, 1}k×m×m is the adjacency matrix, where k is the total number of edge types. An element
e
p
s,t ∈ A equal to 1 indicates that node vs, vt is connected via an edge of type p, and 0 otherwise.
The goal of Devign is to learn a mapping from G to Y , f : G 7→ Y to predict whether a function is
vulnerable or not. The prediction function f can be learned by minimizing the loss function below:
min
n∑
i=1
L(f(gi(V,X,A), yi|ci)) + λω(f) (1)
where L(·) is the cross entropy loss function, ω(·) is a regularization, and λ is an adjustable weight.
2.2 Graph Embedding Layer of Composite Code Semantics
As illustrated in Figure 1, the graph embedding layer EMB is a mapping from the function code ci
to graph data structures as the input of the model, i.e.,
gi(V,X,A) = EMB(ci), ∀i = {1, . . . , n} (2)
In this section, we describe the motivation and method on why and how to utilize the classical code
representations to embed the code into a composite graph for feature learning.
2.2.1 Classical Code Graph Representation and Vulnerability Identification
In program analysis, various representations of the program are utilized to manifest deeper seman-
tics behind the textual code, where classic concepts include ASTs, control flow, and data flow graphs
that capture the syntactic and semantic relationships among the different tokens of the source code.
Majority of vulnerabilities such as memory leak are too subtle to be spotted without a joint consider-
ation of the composite code semantics [14]. For example, it is reported that ASTs alone can be used
to find only insecure arguments [14]. By combining ASTs with control flow graphs, it enables to
cover two more types of vulnerabilities, i.e., resource leaks and some use-after-free vulnerabilities.
By further integrating the three code graphs, it is possible to describe most types except two that
need extra external information (i.e., race condition depending on runtime properties and design
errors that are hard to model without details on the intended design of a program)
Though [14]manually crafted the vulnerability templates in the form of graph traversals, it conveyed
the key insight and proved the feasibility to learn a broader range of vulnerability patterns through
integrating properties of ASTs, control flow graphs and data flow graphs into a joint data structure.
Beside the three classical code structures, we also take the natural sequence of source code into
consideration, since the recent advance on deep learning based vulnerability detection has demon-
strated its effectiveness [10, 11]. It can complement the classical representations because its unique
flat structure captures the relationships of code tokens in a ‘human-readable’ fashion.
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Figure 2: Graph Representation of Code Snippet with Integer Overflow
2.2.2 Graph Embedding of Code
Next we briefly introduce each type of the code representations and how we represent various sub-
graphs into one joint graph, following a code example of integer overflow as in Figure 2(a) and its
graph representation as shown in Figure 2(b).
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) AST is an ordered tree representation structure of source code. Usu-
ally, it is the first-step representation used by code parsers to understand the fundamental structure
of the program and to examine syntactic errors. Hence, it forms the basis for the generation of many
other code representations and the node set of AST V ast includes all the nodes of the rest three code
representations used in this paper. Starting from the root node, the codes are broken down into code
blocks, statements, declaration, expressions etc., and finally into the primary tokens that form the
leaf nodes. The major AST nodes are shown in Figure 2. All the boxes are AST nodes, with specific
codes in the first line and node type annotated. The blue boxes are leaf nodes of AST and purple
arrows represent the child-parent AST relations.
Control Flow Graph (CFG) CFG describes all paths that might be traversed through a program
during its execution. The path alternatives are determined by conditional statements, e.g., if, for,
and switch statements. In CFGs, nodes denote statements and conditions, and they are connected by
directed edges to indicate the transfer of control. The CFG edges are highlighted with green dashed
arrows in Figure 2. Particularly, the flow starts from the entry and ends at the exit, and two different
paths derive at the if statements.
Data Flow Graph (DFG) DFG tracks the usage of variables throughout the CFG. Data flow is
variable oriented and any data flow involves the access or modification of certain variables. A DFG
edge represents the subsequent access or modification onto the same variables. It is illustrated by
orange double arrows in Figure 2 and with the involved variables annotated over the edge. For
example, the parameter b is used in both the if condition and the assignment statement.
Natural Code Sequence (NCS) In order to encode the natural sequential order of the source code,
we use NCS edges to connect neighboring code tokens in the ASTs. The main benefit with such
encoding is to reserve the programming logic reflected by the sequence of source code. The NCS
edges are denoted by red arrows in Figure 2, connect all the leaf nodes of the AST.
Consequently, a function ci can be denoted by a joint graph g with the four types of subgraphs (or 4
types of edges) sharing the same set of nodes V = V ast. As shown in Figure (2), every node v ∈ V
has two attributes, Code and Type. Code contains the source code represented by v, and the type of v
denotes the type attribute. The initial node representation xv shall reflect the two attributes. Hence,
we encode Code by using a pre-trained word2vec model with the code corpus built on the whole
source code files in the projects, and Type by label encoding. We concatenate the two encodings
together as the initial node representation xv .
2.3 Gated Graph Recurrent Layers
The key idea of graph neural networks is to embed node representation from local neighborhoods
through the neighborhood aggregation. Based on the different techniques for aggregating neigh-
borhood information, there are graph convolutional networks [16], GraphSAGE [17], gated graph
recurrent networks [15] and their variants. We chose the gated graph recurrent network to learn the
node embedding, because it allows to go deeper than the other two and is more suitable for our data
with both semantics and graph structures [18].
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Given an embedded graph gi(V,X,A), for each node vj ∈ V , we initialize the node state vector
h
(1)
j ∈ R
z , z ≥ d using the initial annotation by copying xj into the first dimensions and padding
extra 0’s to allow hidden states that are larger than the annotation size, i.e., h1j = [x
⊤
j ,0]
⊤. Let T be
the total number of time-step for neighborhood aggregation. To propagate information throughout
graphs, at each time step t ≤ T , all nodes communicate with each other by passing information via
edges dependent on the edge type and direction (described by the pth adjacent matrixAp ofA, from
the definition we can find that the number of adjacent matrix equals to edge types), i.e.,
a
(t−1)
j,p = A
⊤
p
(
Wp
[
h
(t−1)⊤
1 , . . . , h
(t−1)⊤
m
]
+ b
)
(3)
where Wp ∈ R
z×z is the weight to learn and b is the bias. In particular, a new state aj,p of node
vj is calculated by aggregating information of all neighboring nodes defined on the adjacent matrix
Ap on edge type p. The remaining steps are gated recurrent unit (GRU) that incorporate information
from all types with node v and the previous time step to get the current node’s hidden state h
(t)
i,v, i.e.,
h
(t)
j = GRU(h
(t−1)
j , AGG({a
(t−1)
j,p }
k
p=1)) (4)
where AGG(·) denotes an aggregation function that could be one of the functions
{MEAN,MAX,SUM,CONCAT } to aggregate the information from different edge types to
compute the next time-step node embedding h(t). We use the SUM function in the implementation.
The above propagation procedure iterates over T time steps, and the state vectors at the last time
step H
(T )
i = {h
(T )
j }
m
j=1 is the final node representation matrix for the node set V .
2.4 The Conv Layer
The generated node features from the gated graph recurrent layers can be used as input to any
prediction layer, e.g., for node or link or graph-level prediction, and then the whole model can
be trained in an end-to-end fashion. In our problem, we require to perform the task of graph-level
classification to determine whether a function ci is vulnerable or not. The standard approach to
graph classification is gathering all these generated node embeddings globally, e.g., using a linear
weighted summation to flatly adding up all the embeddings [15, 19] as shown in Eq (5),
y˜i = Sigmoid
(∑
MLP ([H
(T )
i , xi])
)
(5)
where the sigmoid function is used for classification and MLP denotes a Multilayer Perceptron
(MLP) that maps the concatenation of H
(T )
i and xi to a R
m vector. This kind of approach hinders
effective classification over entire graphs [20, 21].
Thus, we design the Convmodule to select sets of nodes and features that are relevant to the current
graph-level task. Previous works in [21] proposed to use a SortPooling layer after the graph convo-
lution layers to sort the node features in a consistent node order for graphs without fixed ordering, so
that traditional neural networks can be added after it and trained to extract useful features character-
izing the rich information encoded in graph. In our problem, each code representation graph has its
own predefined order and connection of nodes encoded in the adjacent matrix, and the node features
are learned through gated recurrent graph layers instead of graph convolution networks that requires
to sort the node features from different channels. Therefore, we directly apply 1-D convolution and
dense neural networks to learn features relevant to the graph-level task for more effective prediction1.
We define σ(·) as a 1-D convolutional layer with maxpooling, then
σ(·) = MAXPOOL
(
Relu
(
CONV (·)
))
(6)
Let l be the number of convolutional layers applied, then the Conv module, can be expressed as
Z
(1)
i = σ
(
[H
(T )
i , xi]
)
, . . . , Z
(l)
i = σ
(
Z
(l−1)
i
)
(7)
Y
(1)
i = σ
(
H
(T )
i
)
, . . . , Y
(l)
i = σ
(
Y
(l−1)
i
)
(8)
y˜i = Sigmoid
(
AVG(MLP (Z
(l)
i )⊙MLP (Y
(l)
i ))
)
(9)
where we firstly apply traditional 1-D convolutional and dense layers respectively on the concate-
nation [H
(T )
i , xi] and the final node featuresH
(T )
i , followed by a pairwise multiplication on the two
outputs, then an average aggregation on the resulted vector, and at last make a prediction.
1We also tried LSTMs and BiLSTMs (with and without attention mechanisms) on the sorted nodes in AST order, however, the convolution
networks work best overall.
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Table 1: Data Sets Overview
Project Sec. Rel. Commits VFCs Non-VFCs Graphs Vul Graphs Non-Vul Graphs
Linux Kernel 12811 8647 4164 16583 11198 5385
QEMU 11910 4932 6978 15645 6648 8997
Wireshark 10004 3814 6190 20021 6386 13635
FFmpeg 13962 5962 8000 6716 3420 3296
Total 48687 23355 25332 58965 27652 31313
3 Evaluation
We evaluate the benefits of Devign against a number of state-of-the-art vulnerability discovery meth-
ods, with the goal of understanding the following questions:
Q1 How does our Devign compare to the other learning based vulnerability identification methods?
Q2 How does our Conv module powered Devign compare to the Ggrn with the flat summation in
Eq (5) for the graph-level classification task?
Q3 Can Devign learn from each type of the code representations (e.g., a single-edged graph with
one type of information)? And how do the Devignmodels with the composite graphs (e.g., all types
of code representations) compare to each of the single-edged graphs?
Q4 Can Devign have a better performance compare to some static analyzers in the real scenario
where the dataset is imbalanced with an extremely low percentage of vulnerable functions?
Q5 How does Devign perform on the latest vulnerabilities reported publicly through CVEs?
3.1 Data Preparation
It is never trivial to obtain high-quality data sets of vulnerable functions due to the demand of
qualified expertise. We noticed that despite [12] released data sets of vulnerable functions, the labels
are generated by statistic analyzers which are not accurate. Other potential datasets used in [22] are
not available. In this work, supported by our industrial partners, we invested a team of security to
collect and label the data from scratch. Besides raw function collection, we need to generate graph
representations for each function and initial representations for each node in a graph. We describe
the detailed procedures below.
Raw Data Gathering To test the capability of Devign in learning vulnerability patterns, we evalu-
ate on manually-labeled functions collected from 4 large C-language open-source projects that are
popular among developers and diversified in functionality, i.e., Linux Kernel, QEMU, Wireshark,
and FFmpeg.
To facilitate and ensure the quality of data labelling, we started by collecting security-related com-
mits which we would label as vulnerability-fix commits or non-vulnerability fix commits, and
then extracted vulnerable or non-vulnerable functions directly from the labeled commits. The
vulnerability-fix commits (VFCs) are commits that fix potential vulnerabilities, from which we can
extract vulnerable functions from the source code of versions previous to the revision made in the
commits. The non-vulnerability-fix commits (non-VFCs) are commits that do not fix any vulnera-
bility, similarly from which we can extract non-vulnerable functions from the source code before
the modification. We adopted the approach proposed in [23] to collect the commits. It consists of
the following two steps. 1) Commits Filtering. Since only a tiny part of commits are vulnerability
related, we exclude the security-unrelated commits whose messages are not matched by a set of
security-related keywords such as DoS and injection. The rest, more likely security-related, are left
for manual labelling. 2) Manual Labelling. A team of four professional security researchers spent
totally 600 man-hours to perform a two round data labelling and cross-verification.
Given a VFC or non-CFC, based on the modified functions, we extract the source code of these
functions before the commit is applied, and assign the labels accordingly.
Graph Generation We make use of the open-source code analysis platform for C/C++ based on
code property graphs, Joern [14], to extract ASTs and CFGs for all functions in our data sets. Due
to some inner compile errors and exceptions in Joern, we can only obtain ASTs and CFGs for
part of functions. We filter out these functions without ASTs and CFGs or with oblivious errors
in ASTs and CFGs. Since the original DFGs edges are labeled with the variables involved, which
tremendously increases the number of the types of edges and meanwhile complicates embedded
graphs, we substitute the DFGs with three other relations, LastRead (DFG_R), LastWrite (DFG_W),
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Table 2: Classification accuracies and F1 scores in percentages: The two far-right columns give
the maximum and average relative difference in accuracy/F1 compared to Devign model with the
composite code representations, i.e., Devign (Composite).
Method
Linux Kernel QEMU Wireshark FFmpeg Combined Max Diff Avg Diff
ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1
Metrics + Xgboost 67.17 79.14 59.49 61.27 70.39 61.31 67.17 63.76 61.36 63.76 14.84 11.80 10.30 8.71
3-layer BiLSTM 67.25 80.41 57.85 57.75 69.08 55.61 53.27 69.51 59.40 65.62 16.48 15.32 14.04 8.78
3-layer BiLSTM + Att 75.63 82.66 65.79 59.92 74.50 58.52 61.71 66.01 69.57 68.65 8.54 13.15 5.97 7.41
CNN 70.72 79.55 60.47 59.29 70.48 58.15 53.42 66.58 63.36 60.13 16.16 13.78 11.72 9.82
Ggrn (AST) 72.65 81.28 70.08 66.84 79.62 64.56 63.54 70.43 67.74 64.67 6.93 8.59 4.69 5.01
Ggrn (CFG) 78.79 82.35 71.42 67.74 79.36 65.40 65.00 71.79 70.62 70.86 4.58 5.33 2.38 2.93
Ggrn (NCS) 78.68 81.84 72.99 69.98 78.13 59.80 65.63 69.09 70.43 69.86 3.95 8.16 2.24 4.45
Ggrn (DFG_C) 70.53 81.03 69.30 56.06 73.17 50.83 63.75 69.44 65.52 64.57 9.05 17.13 6.96 10.18
Ggrn (DFG_R) 72.43 80.39 68.63 56.35 74.15 52.25 63.75 71.49 66.74 62.91 7.17 16.72 6.27 9.88
Ggrn (DFG_W) 71.09 81.27 71.65 65.88 72.72 51.04 64.37 70.52 63.05 63.26 9.21 16.92 6.84 8.17
Ggrn (Composite) 74.55 79.93 72.77 66.25 78.79 67.32 64.46 70.33 70.35 69.37 5.12 6.82 3.23 3.92
Devign (AST) 80.24 84.57 71.31 65.19 79.04 64.37 65.63 71.83 69.21 69.99 3.95 7.88 2.33 3.37
Devign (CFG) 80.03 82.91 74.22 70.73 79.62 66.05 66.89 70.22 71.32 71.27 2.69 3.33 1.00 2.33
Devign (NCS) 79.58 81.41 72.32 68.98 79.75 65.88 67.29 68.89 70.82 68.45 2.29 4.81 1.46 3.84
Devign (DFG_C) 78.81 83.87 72.30 70.62 79.95 66.47 65.83 70.12 69.88 70.21 3.75 3.43 2.06 2.30
Devign (DFG_R) 78.25 80.33 73.77 70.60 80.66 66.17 66.46 72.12 71.49 70.92 3.12 4.64 1.29 2.53
Devign (DFG_W) 78.70 84.21 72.54 71.08 80.59 66.68 67.50 70.86 71.41 71.14 2.08 2.69 1.27 1.77
Devign (Composite) 79.58 84.97 74.33 73.07 81.32 67.96 69.58 73.55 72.26 73.26 - - - -
and ComputedFrom (DFG_C) [24], to make it more adaptive for the graph embedding. DFG_R
represents the immediately last read of each occurrence of the variable. Each occurrence can be
directly recognized from the leaf nodes of ASTs. DFG_W represents the immediately last write
of each occurrence of variables. Similarly, we makes these annotations to the leaf node variables.
DFG_C determines the sources of a variable. In an assignment statement, the left-hand-side (lhs)
variable is assigned with a new value by the right-hand-side (rhs) expression. DFG_C captures such
relations between the lhs variable and each of the rhs variable.
Further, we remove functions with node size greater than 500 for computational efficiency, which
accounts for 15%. We summarize the statistics of the data sets in Table 1.
3.2 Baseline Methods
In the performance comparison, we compare Devign with the state-of-the-art machine-learning-
based vulnerability prediction methods, as well as the gated graph recurrent network (Ggrn) that
used the linearly weighted summation for classification.
Metrics + Xgboost [22]: We collect totally 4 complexity metrics and 11 vulnerability metrics for
each function using Joern, and utilize Xgboost for classification. Here we did not use the proposed
binning and ranking method because it was not learning based, but a heuristic designed to rank the
likelihood of being vulnerable. We search the best parameters via Bayes Optimization [25].
3-layer BiLSTM [10]: It treats the source code as natural languages and input the tokenized code
into bidirectional LSTMs with initial embeddings trained via Word2vec. Here we implemented a
3-layer bidirectional for the best performance.
3-layer BiLSTM + Att: It is an improved version of [10] with the attention mechanism [26].
CNN [11]: Similar to [10], it takes source code as natural languages and utilizes the bag of words
to get the initial embeddings of code tokens, and then feeds them to CNNs to learn.
3.3 Performance Evaluation
Devign Configuration In the embedding layer, the dimension of word2vec for the initial node repre-
sentation is 100. In the gated graph recurrent layer, we set the the dimension of hidden states as 200,
and number of time steps as 6. For the Conv parameters of Devign, we apply (1, 3) filter with ReLU
activation function for the first convolution layer which is followed by a max pooling layer with (1,
3) filter and (1, 2) stride, and (1, 1) filter for the second convolution layer with a max pooling layer
with (2, 2) filter and (1, 2) stride. We use the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.0001 and batch
size 128, and L2 regularization to avoid overfitting. We randomly shuffle each dataset and split 75%
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Table 3: Classification accuracies and F1 scores in percentiles under the imbalanced setting
Method
Cppcheck Flawfinder CXXX 3-layer BiLSTM 3-layer BiLSTM + Att CNN Devign (Composite)
ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1 ACC F1
Linux 75.11 0 78.46 12.57 19.44 5.07 18.25 13.12 8.79 16.16 29.03 15.38 69.41 24.64
QEMU 89.21 0 86.24 7.61 33.64 9.29 29.07 15.54 78.43 10.50 75.88 18.80 89.27 41.12
Wireshark 89.19 10.17 89.92 9.46 33.26 3.95 91.39 10.75 84.90 28.35 86.09 8.69 89.37 42.05
FFmpeg 87.72 0 80.34 12.86 36.04 2.45 11.17 18.71 8.98 16.48 70.07 31.25 69.06 34.92
Combined 85.41 2.27 85.65 10.41 29.57 4.01 9.65 16.59 15.58 16.24 72.47 17.94 75.56 27.25
for the training and the rest 25% for validation. We train our model on Nvidia Graphics Tesla M40
and P40, with 100-epoch patience for early stopping.
Results Analysis We use accuracy and F1 score to measure performance. Table 3.3 summarizes
all the experiment results. First, we analyze the results regarding Q1, the performance of Devign
with other learning based methods. From the results on baseline methods, Ggrn and Devign with
composite code representations, we can see that both Ggrn and Devign significantly outperform
the baseline methods in all the data sets. Especially, compared to all the baseline methods, the
relative accuracy gain by Devign is averagely 10.51%, at least 8.54% on the QEMU dataset. Devign
(Composite) outperforms the 4 baseline methods in terms of F1 score as well, i.e., the relative
gain of F1 score is 8.68% on the average and the minimum relative gains on each dataset (Linux
Kernel, QEMU, Wirshark, FFmpeg and Combined) are 2.31%, 11.80%, 6.65%, 4.04% and 4.61%
respectively. As Linux follows best practices of coding style, the F1 score 84.97 byDevign is highest
among all datasets. Hence, Devign with comprehensive semantics encoded in graphs performs
significantly better than the state-of-the-art vulnerability identification methods.
Next, we investigate the answer to Q2 about the performance gain of Devign against Ggrn. We
first look at the score with the composite code representation. It demonstrates that, in all the data
sets, Devign reaches higher accuracy (an average of 3.23%) than Ggrn, where the highest accuracy
gain is 5.12% on the FFmpeg data set. Also Devign gets higher F1, an average of 3.92% than
Ggrn, where the highest F1 gain is 6.82 % on the QEMU data set. Meanwhile, we look at the score
with each single code representation, from which, we get similar conclusion that generally Devign
significantly outperforms Ggrn, where the maximum accuracy gain is 9.21% for the DFG_W edge
and the maximum F1 gain is 17.13% for the DFG_C. Overall the average accuracy and F1 gain by
Devign compared with Ggrn are 4.66%, 6.37% among all cases, which indicates the Conv module
extracts more related nodes and features for graph-level prediction.
Then we check the results for Q3 to answer whether Devign can learn different types of code rep-
resentation and the performance on composite graphs. Surprisingly we find that the results learned
from single-edged graphs are quite encouraging in both of Ggrn and Devign. For Ggrn, we find
that the accuracy in some specific types of edges is even slightly higher than that in the composite
graph, e.g., both CFG and NCS graphs have better results on the FFmpeg and combined data set.
For Devign, in terms of accuracy, except the Linux data set, the composite graph representation is
overall superior to any single-edged graph with the gain ranging from 0.11% to 3.75%. In terms
of F1 score, the improvement brought by composite graph compared with the single-edged graphs
is averagely 2.69%, ranging from 0.4% to 7.88% in the Devign in all tests. In summary, composite
graphs help Devign to learn better prediction models than single-edged graphs.
To answer Q4 on comparison with static analyzers on the real imbalanced dataset, we randomly
sampled the test data to create imbalanced datasets with 10% vulnerable functions according to a
large industrial scale analysis [23]. We compare with the well-known open-source static analyzers
Cppcheck, Flawfinder, and a commercial tool CXXX which we hide the name for legal concern.
The results are shown in Table , where our approach outperforms significantly all static analyzers
with an F1 score 27.99 higher. Meanwhile, static analyzers tend to miss most vulnerable functions
and have high false positives, e.g., Cppcheck found 0 vulnerability in 3 out of the 4 single project
datasets.
Finally to answer Q5 on the latest exposed vulnerabilities, we scrape the latest 10 CVEs of each
project respectively to check whether Devign can be potentially applied to identify zero-day vulner-
abilities. Based on commit fix of the 40 CVEs, we totally get 112 vulnerable functions. We input
these functions into the trained Devign model and achieve an average accuracy of 74.11%, which
manifests Devign’s potentiality of discovering new vulnerabilities in practical applications.
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4 Related Work
The success of deep learning has inspired the researchers to apply it for more automated solutions to
vulnerability discovery on source code [12, 10, 11]. The recent works [10, 12, 11] treat source code
as flat natural language sequences, and explore the potential of natural language process techniques
in vulnerability detection. For instance, [12, 10] built models upon LSTM/BiLSTM neural networks,
while [11] proposed to use the CNNs instead.
To overcome the limitations of the aforementioned models on expressing logic and structures in
code, a number of works have attempted to probe more structural neural networks such as tree struc-
tures [27] or graph structures [15, 28, 24] for various tasks. For instance, [15] proposed to generate
logical formulas for program verification through gated graph recurrent networks, and [24] aimed
at prediction of variable names and variable miss-usage. [28] proposed Gemini for binary code sim-
ilarity detection, where functions in binary code are represented by attributed control flow graphs
and input Structure2vec [19] for learning graph embedding. Different from all these works, our
work targeted at vulnerability identification, and incorporated comprehensive code representations
to express as many types of vulnerabilities as possible. Beside, our work adopt gated graph recur-
rent layers in [15] to consider semantics of nodes (e.g., node annotations) as well as the structural
features, both of which are important in vulnerability identification. Structure2vec focuses primar-
ily on learning structural features. Compared with [24] that applies gated graph recurrent network
for variable prediction, we explicitly incorporate control flow graph into the composite graph and
propose the Conv module for efficient graph-level classification.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We introduce a novel vulnerability identification model Devign that is able to encode a source-code
function into a joint graph structure from multiple syntax and semantic representations and then
leverage the composite graph representation to effectively learn to discover vulnerable code. It
achieved a new state of the art on machine-learning-based vulnerable function discovery on real
open-source projects. Interesting future works include efficient learning from big functions via
integrating program slicing, applying the learnt model to detect vulnerabilities cross projects, and
generating human-readable or explainable vulnerability assessment.
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